The purpose of this essay is threefold. First, to highlight research of Seonmin KIM, whose 2006 Ph.D. dissertation elucidates complex relationships among Ming China, Choson Korea, Tokugawa Japan, and mountainous ginsengproducing "borderlands" between Korea and China; her 
OLD WORLD SILVER BEFORE GLOBALIZATION
A decisive step toward a silver-based economy in China occurred through substitution of silver and silver-backed paper money in place of copper-based coins during the 13 th century C.E. 1 Nonetheless, unification of trade across EurAsia under the Mongols led to 13 th -century export of Chinese silver in response to powerful inventory demand for silver in Muslim states from Persia to Spain, where silver's purchasing power elevated to double its level in China. 2 The straightforward logic is that demand-side forces helped raise the purchasing power of silver in West Asia and the Mediterranean, while the purchasing power of silver was simultaneously reduced in East Asia due to substitution of (silver-backed) paper money in place of silver itself within China. Simply put, it was profitable to relocate silver from low-value markets within China to high-value markets in western EurAsia and Africa.
Decisive change occurred again during the 15 th century when Chinese fiscal crises led to excessive issuance of paper money. Resulting bouts of hyperinflation destroyed China's silver-exchange standard by the 1430s, at a time of sharp decline in Chinese silver mine production. 3 Abandonment of paper money resulted in increasing reliance upon silver by private merchants, and subsequently by local governments, despite Ming efforts to thwart relentless silver conversions empire-wide. Consequently, productionside collapse coupled with demand-side surge over time catapulted silver's market value within China to double its purchasing power in the Mediterranean world. In short, silver became significantly overvalued within Ming China in dramatic reversal of the prior undervaluation of silver in China during the Mongol period. Given newly-favorable markets for silver in China, the neighboring Chosŏn court permitted silver mining in Hamgyôn province in 1515 and Korean "silver continued to flow out of the country and even gained a reputation in China as high quality silver." 4 While no one seems to have argued that high silver prices in China stimulated the mid-fifteenth-century silver-mining boom in Central Europe, this conclusion seems a distinct possibility. Venetian silver exports eastward alone were double the combined mint output of England and the Low Countries. According to Munro 5 : "The very marked difference in bimetallic ratios certainly indicates that silver was generally always scarcer and thus relatively more valuable…in eastern Asia than it was in Europe." Ottoman invasion/conquest of important Central European mining regions eventuated in a 1503 Ottoman-Venetian treaty and the English Levant Company was founded in 1581, both negotiated for the explicit pur-pose of exporting silver eastward through Ottoman commercial networks. 6 Japan's only significant silver mines prior to the 16 th century were located on the island province of Tsushima, halfway between Korea and Kyushu island, which also served as vector for introduction of Chinese mining technology to Japan via Korea. Silver from Tsushima was evidently insufficient to satisfy domestic markets, however, since Japan imported silver from China from the late 11 th century into the 15 th century.
Despite its later reputation as a primary silver supplier to China, Japan was in fact not always an exporter of precious metals. In the midfifteenth century, the silver and copper coins circulating in Japan were largely from foreign countries….The major source of foreign currency was Korea….It was in the mid-fifteenth century when silver began to be smuggled from Korea to Japan.
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In sum, it should be kept in mind that silver flowed from China into Japan prior to the sixteenth century, and perhaps a portion of that 'Chinese' silver originated in Central European mines.
MERGER OF NEW WORLD AND OLD WORLD SILVER: GLOBALIZATION'S BIRTH DURING THE POTOSÍ-JAPAN CYCLE OF SILVER (1540S-1640S) SINO-SPANISH AMERICAN CONNECTIONS
The most spectacular silver mines in world history were discovered in Spanish America (Upper Peru and Mexico), including unrivaled silver deposits at Potosí (in modern-day Bolivia) in 1545. Spanish America was the only region to out-produce Japan. 8 Attman estimated American silver production at more than 300 metric tons per year during the seventeenth century, compared with Japanese production of at least 200 metric tons per year early in the 17 th century. 9 Much of world silver production -Japanese and American alike -was attracted to Chinese markets due to favorable silver prices in China; according to the same logic, relatively cheap Chinese (non-silver) exports -such as silks and ceramics -were attracted to markets worldwide that beckoned with price offers several times higher than Chinese prices for these items.
Historians a generation ago wrote as if massive imports of precious metals from the Americas were destined for end-market customers within European nation-states. As scholars began to subsequently re-conceptualize American silver in global (rather than European) perspective over the past 30+ years, however, a less-Eurocentric picture has emerged. American silver was not exported to Europe; American silver was exported to China through Europe (and through India as well during certain time periods). Silver values were ultimately determined in global markets, not in national markets.
American silver traversed myriad trade routes toward end markets that beckoned via elevated prices for the white metal, notably Chinese markets during the "Potosí-Japan Cycle of Silver" (1540s to 1640s). Over half of world silver production is estimated to have emanated from spectacular mines at remote Potosí in Upper Peru (modern day Bolivia) during this first global cycle of silver. Legal silver was transported via pack animal to the Pacific coast, then shipped north to (present-day) Panama, transferred overland to Puerto Bello on the Atlantic-Caribbean side en route to Havana, where Peruvian silver joined Mexican silver exported via Vera Cruz to Havana. Heavily-armed Spanish fleets subsequently guided dozens of tons of silver per ship from Havana to Europe via Cadiz or Seville. In addition, threats of capital punishment failed to discourage smuggling of an estimated 50 tons of silver annually (about 2 million pesos worth) two thousand miles via Potosí's socalled 'Back Door' to Atlantic ports Buenos Aires and Sacramento (along the Rio de la Plata, 'River of Silver').
10 African slaves constituted a major category of New World imports via the Atlantic; African slaves were essentially exchanged for clandestine (yet highly visible) American Back-Door silver exports during the (1540s-1640) Potosí-Japan silver cycle.
…settlers of Buenos Aires for most of the seventeenth century were relegated to a simple economy in which the port represented little more than the disembarkation point for Negroes and trade goods destined for the wealthier provinces of the interior and the embarkation point for the contraband silver that flowed out in exchange.
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A portion of Peruvian silver that sailed northward along the Pacific Coast passed through Acapulco, outstanding East Pacific harbor, destined for arguably the best natural harbor in the West Pacific, Manila Bay. Manila was a linchpin entrepôt that teemed with Chinese merchants who had direct and indirect linkages to vast Chinese markets (European merchants in Asia similarly focused on silver and the Chinese marketplace). Although silver smuggled aboard Acapulco-Manila galleons obviously cannot be substantiated in official documents, we can infer shipment of approximately 50 tons of silver (i.e. 2 million pesos, most of which was smuggled) annually westward through Manila and onto China throughout the 17 th century; since two million pesos worth of Chinese silks are known to have entered Mexico via Manila annually during the 17 th century, an equivalent value of silver must have annually traversed westward toward China simultaneously.
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Once Spanish American silver reached Spain via the Atlantic, control of the white metal quickly passed to non-Spaniards. Portuguese and Dutch had established maritime footholds in Asia prior to Spaniards, thus (along with English, and other Europeans later on) having already secured crucial Asian entrepôts necessary to profitably channel silver to end-markets within China. Silver comprised the overwhelming percentage of the value of European shipments to Asia. Overall, perhaps three-quarters of Spanish American silver exports traversed the Atlantic Ocean, while the remaining one-quarter exited via Pacific Ocean exports. Whichever route -eastward via the Atlantic or westward via the Pacific -Chinese end-markets dominated global trade in silver via land and sea.
American silver quickly passed through Spain. Amsterdam was a major distribution center in northern Europe; and an estimated 50 tons of silver traveled annually eastward through the Baltic Sea. 13 Silver flowed through the Ottoman Empire, via the Silk 12 According to Harry E. Cross, "Quantities of silver left the New World through the ports of Buenos Aires and Sacramento and through the Manila Galleons. At the peak of these activities, perhaps as much as 6 million pesos per year (159,000 kg), or half of the output of Peru, was diverted to these channels from the Seville trade." Cross, "South American Bullion Production and Export, 1550-1750," 14 As stated in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, and by countless other scholars over the centuries, China was the main attractor of American silver. Although rampant smuggling (partly to avoid tax payments) renders precise estimation of flows of American silver into East Asia impossible, such transfers were clearly on a scale that surpassed any experience in prior history.
JAPANESE SILVER AND SINO-KOREAN-JAPANESE CONNECTIONS
Prodigious Japanese silver mines were discovered in the 1520s at Iwami, western Honshu, followed in 1542 by discoveries at Ikuno (near Osaka). Chinese technology for extracting silver from ore was implemented in 1553 (by Korean miners via Tsushima): the haibuki process involved smelting lead and silver-containing ores, congealing them; ash was then blown onto the mixture in order to remove the lead. Silver production surged dramatically and Japan became the world's second-most significant silver exporter (behind Spanish America) from the middle of the sixteenth century into the seventeenth century. 15 The vast majority of Japanese silver was exported 15 First introduced into Korea from China in 1503, the ash-blowing technique for silver extraction was forwarded to Japan by a Korean official in 1539. Coupled with discovery of pro-to China (and to India, both as end-market and as re-exporter) due to surge in the price of silver within China. 16 Chinese raw silk comprised the main item imported into Japan at the time.
Upon seizure of enormously profitable Japanese mines, the Shogun subdued hundreds of powerful feudal lords (daimyos), which eventually led to unification of Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate (established in 1600).
The shogunate policy concerning precious metals was focused at first upon management and operation of mines. While taking power at the beginning of the 17 th century, the Tokugawa controlled all mines directly or indirectly, and seized the gold and silver produced there.
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The Tokugawa Bakufu, which took an active role in promoting mining and smelting technology, directly controlled all the silver and gold digious silver deposits at Iwami and Ikuno, "[t]his new technique began to change Japan from a traditionally silver poor country to a major exporter." Kim, "Borders and Crossings," 208. 16 For a clear overview of shifting Japanese metal exports -silver, gold, then copperduring the 17 th century, Fujita documents shift of Dutch VOC exports from Japan via Taiwan into India and Persia (rather than into China): "Only 22 percent of silver was re-exported to other factories, mainly in India and Persia, between 1638 and 1649. Thus, we can say that the rest was paid to Chinese merchants and brought to China between 1638 and 1649. In contrast, 90 percent of the silver passing through Taiwan was transferred to India and Persia by the VOC between 1650 and 1661." (Kayoko Fujita, "In the Twilight of the Silver Century: A Re-Examination of Dutch Metal Trade in the Asian Maritime Trade Networks," Global History and Maritime Asia Working and Discussion Paper Series. Working Paper, vol. 1 (Osaka: Global History and Maritime Asia. 2005), 9. Fujita's emphasis upon "final destinations" deserves consideration: "Thus we need to be cautious about interpreting primary sources like invoices or manifests, since destinations cited in those forms at Hirado and Nagasaki factories were not always the final destinations of cargoes -especially when cargoes were shipped to transit ports such as Taijouan and Malacca." (Fujita, "In the Twilight of the Silver Century," 6) Fujita's "final destinations" correspond to our "end markets" terminology in this essay. Note that Fujita explicitly avoids any claim that Japanese silver exports to Bengal and Surat, for example, necessarily remained in those locations: "How Japanese silver re-exported from Taiwan circulated after entering the Indian subcontinent is beyond the scope of this paper. It may have been re-exported from India subsequently and ultimately absorbed in China. Further investigation is necessary." (Fujita, "In the Twilight of the Silver Century," 9) End-market destinations shifted over time, so overgeneralization concerning permanent trade patterns must be avoided. 17 mined in Japan. After 1601, the Bakufu possessed a virtual monopoly over the gold and silver output. 18 Chinese, Portuguese and Dutch exports of Japanese silver via Nagasaki have long occupied attention, and justifiably so, but Tsushima-and-Korea provided an alternative route through which silver reached China. Centered on Beijing, rhythms of the Ming tribute-trade calendar determined seasonal pulsations of silver siphoned into China through Korea. 19 Massive smuggling of silver fueled private trade that accompanied (and often dominated) official tribute trade through Korea, as was true worldwide for smuggled silver.
Although initially displeased with the flow of Japanese silver via Tsushima and Korea to China, Choson Korea permitted the lord of Tsushima to send twenty silver-laden ships annually to Pusan in what amounted to a Korean leg of the tribute-trade system linked to China. There were no volume restrictions on private 'market trade' (kaesi) that accompanied official trade, so long as taxes were paid. Unsurprisingly, tax avoidance became the norm. Methods used to smuggle silver through Korea to China -via interpreters, horse drivers, luggage transportation, bogus 'loans' to Chinese, etc -are documented in Kim. 20 Enormous demand for silver in Chinese markets, coupled with voluminous demand for Chinese silks, created irrepressible smuggling opportunities:
As the Vice Ambassador in the embassy in 1679…witnessed, many state offices preferred to receive Chinese raw silk, instead of silver, for their loan because Chinese raw silk was very popular among Tsushima merchants in Pusan. The market price of Chinese silk in Pusan was 2.7 times higher than that in China. Korean transshipments of Chinese raw silks and Borderlands ginseng to Japan, of course, required equivalent exports of Japanese silver through Korea into China during this general period:
The rapid growth of ginseng trade, both official and illegal, therefore caused more than massive drainage of Korean ginseng to Japan. It also resulted in huge inflows of Japanese silver to Korea. In 1686, when Japanese silver import reached its highest point, 2,887 kan of silver came into Korea. This amount was six times greater than the amount exported from Nagasaki to China in the same year. The total amount of silver exported to Korea from 1684 to 1710 was 48,356 kan, or an annual average of 1,791 kan.
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In addition, Spanish American silver entered China via Manila and Ryukyu (Okinawa).
Ryukyu had long maintained tribute-trade relations with Ming China and Korea via provision of Southeast Asian products, but the situation changed and intensified when silver became a dominant global commodity:
[E]xchange of documents and presents between Korea and Ryukyu
[now] took place at Huitongguan (the 'Residence Hall') in Beijing, where their respective envoys met. In other words, …previous contact involved Japan, and the new contact brought China into the picture. How could Spain, a small country of six million inhabitants, become Europe's most feared military power in the latesixteenth/early-seventeenth centuries, having revolutionized neither domestic agricultural nor industrial sectors? The answer is straight-forward: profits based upon American silver. The Crown gained control over the richest silver mines in world history in Upper Peru and Mexico. Implementation of new technologies, such as the mercury-amalgam process, reduced production costs at mines that were already inherently fertile. Global demand for silver, thanks largely to developments within China, simultaneously bolstered the world price of silver. Low cost of production combined with soaring price is every businessperson's dream, of course, and high profit per unit of product was the result. The Spanish Empire was financed by extraordinarily high profits per unit of mined silver. Accumulating stocks of silver slowly depressed silver's price, however, until "excess profits" (which economists call 'economic profit') per unit of silver were finally eliminated around 1640. In short, it took a century for the world silver market to achieve equilibrium -that is, zero economic profit per unit of silver -by which time Spain had ineluctably become a second-rate power. Elimination of silver profits was inevitable, of course, but how did the Spanish Crown dispose of the mountain of super-profits generated over a century? Answer: Spain engaged in continuous warfare on a global scale. Expansion (followed by maintenance) of the Spanish Empire absorbed massive amounts of wealth. Given steadily eroding mine profits, maintenance -never mind enhancement -of infrastructure and development-inducing investment was impossible. Mine profits declined ineluctably in Japan as well, but the Tokugawa Shogunate confronted/created an environment strikingly different from that of Hapsburg Spain.
In an unrealistic attempt to conquer Ming China, 160,000 troops of Hideyoshi occupied Korea during1592-98 (prior to full unification of Japan itself). After this 1590s invasion-of-Korea debacle, Japan morphed into an essentially market-oriented domestic society under Tokugawa rule, according to Hayami, 26 albeit with mines, feudal families, and international trade firmly under control of the Shogun. In addition, centuries of Pax Tokugawa removed economic burdens associated with maintenance of vast military establishments.
Trade via Korea surged during the 17 th century (and into the 18 th century). The so-called "closure' of Japan in the 1630s -sakoku -did not prohibit trade. Rather, the Tokugawa Shogunate controlled international trade. Indeed, Japan became an important exporter of gold later in the 17 th century, 27 and also emerged as the world's preeminent exporter of copper.
It was not until 1668…that copper emerged as the second most important commodity in the [VOC] Company's export trade with Japan, surpassed only by gold in terms of value. In the second half of the 1670s it became the single most important commodity. Although Japanese copper reached their peak in value around 1700 and then suffered a fall in value during the first decade of the eighteenth century, copper still continued to occupy the largest share of export value from Japan. Consequently, it remained the most profitable commodity in this trade link. 28 Thousands of tons of Japanese copper entered China annually. Japanese copper exports to Europe were far smaller in scale, yet were at times significant:
During the peak years 1672-5, Dutch imports of Japanese copper equaled perhaps half of the calculated Swedish exports at that time.
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Nor should the role of copper as a ballast item be ignored:
The European trend in Japanese copper imports reached two peaks between 1650 and 1720. The first peak occurred during the 1660s and lasted until the 1670s, and the second was from the 1690s to the 1710s… The first large peak was caused by an increase in the demand for copper to be used for the casting of artillery pieces. Moreover, the fall in the price of sugar on the European market in the 1650s and of saltpeter in the 1670s boosted Japanese copper imports into Europe, as both types of merchandise were goods necessary to maintain the balance of the ship's ballast so a substitute had to be found. During the first peak period, there were two hard-fought wars in Europe which affected the copper market… Indeed, the share of Japanese copper in the 1670s was as high as one-third to one-half of Swedish copper. The second large peak is also attributable to a military demand for copper, especially in the first decade of the eighteenth century. 30 Nonetheless, more than 90 percent of total reshipments of copper by the VOC were destined for South Asia, and the Dutch by no means monopolized the copper trade:
The VOC did not have a total monopoly. Copper was exported also from Nagasaki on Chinese junks and the Japanese exported copper on 
CHINESE-KOREAN-JAPANESE "TRIANGULAR TRADE"
It was suggested earlier in this essay that silver from Central European mines may have found destinations in Chinese markets during the second half of the 15 th century, due to elevated Chinese silver prices in response to collapse of China's paper money system. If significant quantities of European silver did indeed enter China during the fifteenth century, then European silver must have also flowed into Japan via Korea: "It was the mid fifteenth century when silver began to be smuggled from Korea to Japan." 32 It is unsurprising that few scholars emphasize fifteenth-century Korean exports of silver to Japan, given the dramatic subsequent reversal of silver's trade flow during the sixteenth century:
Such flows of silver from Korea to Japan were completely reversed by the mid-sixteenth century when Japan adopted the haifuki method and discovered two major silver mines [Iwami and Ikuno]… The more Japanese silver became available the more Korean traders were able to expand their business with China. The Choson court worried that, once the Ming court noticed this situation, Korea would be required to resume silver tribute. 33 Massive quantities of (official and clandestine) Japanese silver flowed to -and mostly through -Korea into China during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Since Chinese markets offered the highest silver prices in the world, the white metal was attracted to China irrespective of whether sources of silver were mines located in Japan, Spanish America, or elsewhere. Japanese silver exports exchanged directly for Chinese raw-silk imports through the first half of the 17 th century. 34 The high price of silver in China -indicated by elevation of the base-height of the "China (End Market)" container in Figure 1 -provided intense motivation for shipments of silver to Chinese markets. Chinese-silk-for-Japanese-silver-exchange nexus. 35 Korean access to officially-authorized Japanese silver was restricted to Japan House in Pusan. (Although smuggling was common, as elsewhere.) The So family, lord of Tsushima, was permitted to send twenty ships annually -laden with Japanese silver -to Korea beginning in 1609. Prodigious quantities of Chinese raw silk counter-flowed into Japan via Korea-Tsushima, as other scholars have emphasized for some time. 36 Professor Kim's research reveals the unique and crucial role played by ginseng exports to Japan via Korea, however, a commodity destined to shape general East Asian history beginning in the second half of the sixteenth century. 37 Figure 2 provides a general overview of major trade items connected to the silk-silver-ginseng exchange across East Asia. Major product groups were essentially swapped for each other over time. We next offer visual outlines of market forces that determined trade of specific items by region.
Korean ginseng had been the most valuable gift presented to Chinese emperors dating back to the 4 th century C.E. Borderlands between Korea and China contained unique concentrations of high-quality wild ginseng, which became the preeminent borderlands export-tribute item sent to both Ming China and Choson Korea by the second half of the sixteenth century. 38 In exchange, the borderlands imported diverse finished products from China, while remaining fundamentally dependent upon Korean food imports that were "essential for [borderlands] survival."
39 In addition to Since goods ultimately swapped for goods, Japanese silver exports traded for Japanese imports; Chinese silks and borderlands ginseng were the two most significant items that passed through Korea in exchanged for Japanese silver. Increase in volume of Japanese Inventory Demand for ginseng over time, congruent with expanding Japanese silver exports, is demonstrated visually via expansion of the "Japan (End Market)" ginseng container's volume in Figure 4 relative to the smaller "Japan (End Market)" ginseng container volume in Figure 3 (representing an earlier time period than Figure 4) . Raw silks constituted China's most important export item throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, dominating eastbound cargoes aboard Manila-Acapulco galleons that crossed the Pacific Ocean, for example, destined for Mexico and beyond. 41 This lucrative silk-for-silver-exchange pattern characterized Chinese-Japanese trade as well, enticing Asian and European merchants into the prodigious silk-for-silver trade. In this context, Korea played a central role in East Asia's silk-for-silver nexus, one facet of a massive set of interconnect market systems operating at a global level. 42 As indicated in Figure 5 , some (unknown to us) portion of Korean imports of Chinese raw silks must have been retained within Korea, since raw silks must have furnished inputs for Korea's domestic silk textile industry. Korean silk textile products (not shown here) may have been retained by end-market customers within Korea mostly, one would imagine, yet Korean silk textiles may have been exported (alongside Korean cotton textiles) to the borderlands as well. In any case, huge volumes of Chinese raw silks are known to have been re-exported from Korea to Japan. 41 Chinese silks of various qualities proliferated throughout the Americas, but they also entered Europe via Havana. Thus, Spanish merchant complaints against relentless silver drains westward across the Pacific can also be viewed as pleas for protection against low-price Chinese silk imports into markets coveted by Europeans. Significant transportation expenses involved in crossing the Pacific Ocean, the breadth of Mexico, and the Atlantic Ocean notwithstanding, Chinese silks dominated. The three major borderlands export "Treasures of Manchuria" -ginseng, sable furs, and pearls -came under control of Jianzhou Jurchens:
His monopoly of trade with the Chinese provided Nurhaci with a solid economic ground on which to consolidate Jurchen tribes and later establish the Latter Jin… By the early seventeenth century, aside from booty, ginseng trade was the major source of income for Nurhaci's treasuries….Profits from ginseng trade were remarkable. As Imamura Tomo notes, it was not only his [Nurhaci's] military supremacy… but also his economic wealth from exclusive ginseng trade. 43 Ginseng exports to Japan rivaled and perhaps surpassed ginseng exports to China itself over time (depicted via growth in Japan's container capacity in Figure 4 vis-à-vis Figure 3) . Exports from the borderlands became sufficiently lucrative that they financed conquest of Choson Korea by Jianzhou Jurchens in the 1630s, as well as subsequent overthrow of the Ming Dynasty in the 1640s. Originally vassals to both Choson Korea (in turn vassal to China) and Ming China, borderlands Manchus eventually achieved sovereignty over both. Absent economic wealth generated via ginseng exports, it is difficult to imagine how triumphant Manchus could have overthrown the Ming Dynasty and thereby establish the Qing Dynasty  (1644-1911) .
On the silver-side of the trade, the Shogun subdued over two hundred and fifty formidable daimyo lords after having gained complete control of rich Japanese mines, a requirement for unification of Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate in 1600. Japanese unification depended upon profits generated through over a half century of silver exports to Chinese markets. Indeed, silver profits financed Hideyoshi's dispatch of 160,000 Japanese soldiers to Korea in the 1590s en route to planned overthrow of the Ming Empire. This expensive invasion became a spectacular failure, but "Choson Jurchens, yet Korea needed borderlands ginseng in order to obtain Japanese silver, in turn, required for sustenance of trade with China. At the same time, Jurchens survival depended upon importation of rice and other Korean foods (indicated in Figure 6 ). Korean and the borderlands economies had become mutually interdependent.
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Figure 6. Korean Rice/Food exports to the Borderlands A vassal of China, however, Choson Korea had little choice but to send troops into the borderlands in half-hearted support of Ming military efforts. Ginseng-rich Latter Jin (another name for Jianzhou Jurchens) achieved sufficient resources over time, however, to afford a 30,000-troop invasion and defeat of Korea in 1627. 45 Severe famine in Manchuria after the 1627 invasion, however, caused even greater urgency for borderlands acquisition of Korean foods. Successor to Nurhaci, Hung Taiji send 100,000 troops in brutal subordination of Korea in 1636. 46 Hung then proceeded to fight through Inner Mongolia and to defeat northern Ming defenders in 1636. The (renamed) "Northern Jin" then proceeded to defeat Ming rulers, thereby founding the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). The Qing continued to maintain full control of borderlands ginseng, of course, while also inheriting the traditional Ming role of importation of foreign silver in exchange for Chinese exports.
GLOBAL SILVER IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Japanese silver mines had been mostly exhausted by the end of the seventeenth century. Japan became the world's largest exporter of copper by this time, however, much of which was again destined for end-markets in China. Significant quantities of Japanese copper entered European end-markets as well (via the Dutch). Japanese gold production surged too. Unlike Imperial Spain, in other words, the Shogun possessed considerable non-silver resources.
Thanks in large measure to dissemination of crops of American origin -especially the sweet potato, maize, peanut, and tobacco -China's landmass increased during the eighteenth century, while Chinese population more than doubled. Growth in Chinese population, in turn, augmented inventory demand for silver within China (strong movement back to copper-based monies within China notwithstanding). As a result of population growth, rising silver prices within China came to command a 50% premium over silver's price in the rest of the world by 1700. In conjunction with implementation of cost-reducing new mining technologies in Spanish America, this elevated silver price provoked an unprecedented silver mining boom during the "Mexican Cycle of Silver" that commenced around 1700. As a consequence, 18 th -century flows of silver into China surpassed silver imports during the 16 th and 17 th centuries combined. Elevation of the base of the container labeled "China (End Market)" in Figure 7 offers visual depiction of this price premium for silver within China vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Unsurprisingly, Spanish-American silver poured ever more relentlessly into Chinese markets that offered premium prices for silver.
Fifty years of unprecedented production and export of Spanish-American silver ultimately pushed silver's price within China down to the world silver price level by 1750, as indicated by lowering of the "China (End Market)" container base to a level comparable to container-base heights elsewhere (Figure 8 ).. In economics jargon, "economic profits" diminished to zero, which means that actual profit rates fell to normal profit rates (typically experienced by industries generally). Mexican Cycle of Silver "super profits" had vanished by around 1750, in other words, since fifty years of arbitrage trade resulted in accumulations of silver within China that eliminated arbitrage "super profits" that had existed during the half-century Mexican Cycle of Silver (1700-1750); elimination of "super profits" was a replay (on a larger scale) of the same outcome observed during the "Potosí-Japan Cycle of Silver" of the earlier 1540s-1640 silver boom period.
47 "Normal profits" continued to entice importation of silver into China during the second half of the eighteenth century, that is, but profits associated with export of silver to China by this time had become pedestrian. Readers may wonder how such vast quantities of silver could continue to enter China when silver-industry profits had dwindled to pedestrian levels: It is easy to imagine why merchants throughout the world concentrated on sending silver toward China when significant arbitrage profits were available -just buy silver where it is cheap and sell it where it is dear! But what market mechanisms explain China's absorption of silver during non-arbitrage phases, such as during the post-1750 period, when economic profits had fallen to zero? The Hydraulic Metaphor reveals market forces at work while silver continued to flow into unspectacular markets.
China continued to import millions of Mexican silver pesos annually during the second half of the eighteenth century, despite elimination of all Chinese silver-price premia. For simplicity, assume that the stock of silver pesos held within China in, say, 1780 were equal to 500 million pesos (shown in Figure 9A ). Assume further that one percent of the peso stock in China was either worn out or lost each year, a 5-million-pesos annual inventory loss represented by evaporation bubbles above "China (End Market)" in Figure 8 . In the absence of imports of silver into China, in other words, China's inventory stock of pesos would fall to 495 million pesos (other things equal) after one year. Alternatively, existing Chinese silver stocks could be maintained from one year to the next if 5 million Mexican pesos were imported annually. And as had been the case for centuries, importation of foreign silver into China required that China export an equivalent value in goods in exchange for imported silver. For simplicity, assume that China's sole late-eighteenth-century export were tea, a consumable product (in contrast to silver, a non-consumable). Domestic Chinese tea consumption must have been substantial, yet vast quantities of tea were exported to Korea, Japan, other Asian markets, and increasingly to England (and elsewhere). Compared with silver, teas maintain freshness for a short time; inventory tea holdings are therefore relatively modest and teas are consumed quickly. Figure 9 deliberately depicts relatively small inventory holdings of tea within endmarkets in Korea, Japan and England; note that despite relatively modest tea inventories, tea consumption is nonetheless relatively robust. The essential point is this: Substantial annual imports of silver were required to replenish inventory stocks of nonconsumable silver within China because the inventory volume of silver held was vast. Although silver's decay rate may have been only one percent annually, one-one-hundredth of vast silver holdings implied importation of millions of silver pesos annually -just to maintain silver stocks. Inventory volumes of tea held outside of China were relatively small by comparison, on the other hand, yet Chinese tea exports were robust because consumption rates for Chinese teas worldwide were relatively high. Durable goods (such as metals) accumulate to a far greater extend than do non-durableconsumable goods (such as ginseng); proper conceptualization of trade history requires recognition of the crucial role played by accumulation of goods. Scholars need to pay attention to wealth accumulations, in other words, and avoid exclusive concentration on exchanges (income and expenditures) without recognition that the durability of a specific trade item matters. Note that profits need not be unusually high in order to justify replication of exports/imports depicted in Figures 8 and 9 over time. Key to understanding centuries of silver imports into China rests, once again, upon recognition that the volume of Chinese silver holdings was vast. Maintenance of a steady-state volume of silver inventories required importation of millions of silver pesos annually, which in turn required annual export of equivalent millions worth of Chinese silks, ceramics, teas, and other products. Although end-market inventory holdings of tea may have been relatively modest -compared with end-market inventory holdings of silver -tea quality is assumed to decline relatively quickly, leading customers to replenish relatively small tea inventories regularly. Chinese tea exports were robust because customers around the world drank prodigious quantities of the liquid continuously; Chinese imports of silver (a non-consumable) remained strong, on the other hand, because a small percentage loss (decay) of vast silver holdings implied importation of millions of silver pesos annually in order to replenish and maintain stocks.
Once the Chinese price of silver had again declined to silver's price in the rest of the world by 1750 (as happened previously around 1640), the lucrative Mexican Cycle of Silver had ended (in the sense that silver-industry profits shrunk to a normal level). Trade of silver was okay, but nothing that would over-excite merchants. Struggling merchants always search for vibrant trade opportunities, of course, and the opium market was next to present opportunity for huge economic profits (once Bengal came under British control from 1757). While it is the case that English East India Company exports of silver comprised two-thirds of total EIC exports to China by value during the late-18 th century, silver's depressed price implied modest silver-trade profits (as shown in Figure 8) . While Bengali opium accounted for only one-third of the value of EIC exports to China, on the other hand, the opium trade generated far greater economic profits (Figure 10 ) than did British silver exports to China, simply because opium prices in China were unusually high for some time (i.e. arbitrage opportunities in the opium business were excellent). In short, high monetary trade values do not necessarily imply robust profits; relatively small components of overall trade sometimes generate the bulk of profits. Profits generated through trade of silver were modest (Figure 8 ), for example, even though silver comprised two-thirds of overall British exports to China. English East India Company opium profits were strong (Figure 10 ), in contrast, even though opium exports to China were but half of EIC silver exports to China (in terms of value).
